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1Abstract
We show that a life cycle model with realistically calibrated uninsurable labor income
risk and moderate risk aversion can simultaneously match stock market participation rates
and asset allocation decisions conditional on participation. The key ingredients of the model
are Epstein-Zin preferences, a ﬁxed stock market entry cost, and moderate heterogeneity
in risk aversion. Households with low risk aversion smooth earnings shocks with a small
buﬀer stock of assets, and consequently most of them (optimally) never invest in equities.
Therefore, the marginal stockholders are (endogenously) more risk averse, and as a result
they do not invest their portfolios fully in stocks.
2In this paper we present a life cycle asset allocation model with intermediate consumption
and stochastic uninsurable labor income that provides an explanation for two very important
empirical observations: low stock market participation rates in the population as a whole,
and moderate equity holdings for stock market participants.
Our life cycle model integrates three main motives that have been identiﬁed as quan-
titatively important in explaining individual and aggregate wealth accumulation. First, a
precautionary savings motive driven by the presence of undiversiﬁable labor income risk
(Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1992, 1997)). Second, pension income is lower than mean
working-life labor income, implying that saving for retirement becomes important at some
point in the life cycle. The combination of precautionary and retirement saving motives has
recently been shown to generate realistic wealth accumulation proﬁles over the life cycle.1
Third, we explicitly incorporate a bequest motive that has recently been shown to be im-
portant in matching the skewness of the wealth distribution (de Nardi (forthcoming) and
Laitner (2002)).
More recently, life cycle models incorporating some (or all) of these motives have been
extended to include an asset allocation decision, both in an inﬁnite-horizon2 a n di naﬁnite-
horizon, life cycle setting.3 However, several important predictions of these models are still
at odds with empirical regularities. First, low stock market participation in the population
(Mankiw and Zeldes (1991)) persists. The latest Survey of Consumer Finances (2001) re-
ports that only 52% of U.S. households hold stocks either directly or indirectly (through
pension funds, for instance), while these models predict that, given the equity premium, all
households should participate in the stock market as soon as saving takes place. Second,
3households in the model invest almost all of their wealth in stocks, in contrast to both casual
empirical observation and to formal empirical evidence (see Poterba and Samwick (1999) or
Ameriks and Zeldes (2001), for instance).
We develop a life cycle asset allocation model that tries to address these two puzzles. We
argue that it is possible to simultaneously match stock market participation rates and asset
allocation conditional on participation, with moderate values of risk aversion (between one
and ﬁve), and without extreme assumptions about the level of background risk. Our model
has three key features. First, we include a ﬁxed entry cost for households that want to invest
in risky assets for the ﬁrst time. A large literature has concluded that some level of ﬁxed
costs seems to be necessary to improve the empirical performance of asset pricing models.4
Since the excessive demand for equities predicted by asset allocation models is merely the
portfolio-demand manifestation of the equity premium puzzle, introducing a ﬁxed cost in
the model seems to be a natural extension. Moreover, recent empirical work suggests that
small entry costs can be consistent with the observed low stock market participation rates
(see Paiella (2001), Degeorge et al. (2002) and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002b)).
The other two key features are motivated by the (perhaps surprising) implication of the
model that participation rates are an increasing function of risk aversion, at least over a
wide range of parameter values. Speciﬁcally, changing risk aversion generates two opposing
forces for determining the participation decision. On one hand, more risk-averse households
optimally prefer to invest a smaller fraction of their wealth in stocks. On the other hand, risk
aversion determines prudence and more prudent consumers accumulate signiﬁcantly more
wealth over the life cycle. We show that the higher wealth accumulation motive dominates
4for moderate coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion (that is, not greater than ﬁve). As a result,
the less risk-averse investors have a weaker incentive to pay the ﬁxed cost. This explains
why previous attempts to match participation rates in the context of a life cycle model were
fairly unsuccessful. If we try to match asset allocation decisions by assuming high values of
risk aversion, the implied participation rates are counterfactually high (e.g., Campbell et al.
(2001)). Motivated by this result, we allow for preference heterogeneity in the population,
the second key feature of the model. As argued before, since the less risk-averse investors
accumulate less wealth over the life cycle, the majority optimally chooses not to pay the
ﬁxed cost. Therefore, endogenously stock market participants tend to be the more risk-
averse investors, and consequently, even after paying the ﬁxed cost, they do not invest their
portfolios fully in equities.
The ﬁnal important feature of the model is the assumption of Epstein-Zin preferences,
which allows us to separate risk aversion from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
(EIS). In the context of a life cycle model with labor income, wealth accumulation is a crucial
determinant of both the stock market participation and the asset allocation decision. Within
the power utility framework, households with low risk aversion also have a high EIS. Given
that the expected return from investing in the stock market is higher than the discount
rate, a higher EIS increases savings. As a result, even though the less risk-averse agents
would not save much for precautionary reasons, they would have a strong incentive to save
for retirement (and for a potential bequest motive). Thus, breaking the link between risk
aversion and the EIS is crucial for delivering predictions that are consistent with the observed
empirical evidence.
5Therefore, in our model, households with very low risk aversion and low (moderate) EIS
smooth idiosyncratic earnings shocks with a small buﬀer stock of assets, and most of them
never invest in equities (thus behaving as in the Deaton (1991) inﬁnite horizon model).5 This
seems to describe adequately the behavior of a large fraction of the U.S. population that
retires without signiﬁcant ﬁnancial assets (and does not participate in the stock market).
Within the low EIS and low risk aversion group, only a small fraction owns stocks, and
they do so only as they get close to retirement. On the other hand, investors with high
prudence and high EIS are the ones who participate in the stock market from early on, since
they accumulate more wealth and therefore have a stronger incentive to pay the ﬁxed cost.
Therefore, the marginal stockholders are (endogenously) more risk averse and as a result
they do not invest their portfolios fully in stocks.
The heterogeneous agent model can simultaneously match the stock market participa-
tion rate and the average equity allocation conditional on participation, from the Survey of
Consumer Finances. The life cycle proﬁle of the participation rate is also very close to the
one observed in the data. On the negative side, the model still counterfactually predicts
that young households that have already paid the participation cost will invest most of their
portfolio in equities.6 Finally, the degree of heterogeneity in the wealth distribution is quite
comparable to the one observed in the data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I summarizes results from the
existing empirical literature on life cycle asset allocation, while section II outlines the model
and calibration. In Sections III and IV we discuss the results in the absence and presence
of the ﬁxed entry cost, respectively. Finally, Section V concludes.
6I. Empirical Evidence on Life Cycle Asset Allocation and Stock Market
Participation
In most industrialized countries, stock market participation rates have increased substan-
tially during the last decade. Nevertheless, a large percentage of the population still does
not own any stocks (either directly or indirectly through pension funds). Moreover, even
those households that do own stocks still invest a signiﬁcant fraction of their portfolios in
alternative assets.
Figures 1A and 1B summarize evidence reported in Ameriks and Zeldes (2001).7 The
results are sensitive to the identifying assumptions regarding time versus cohort eﬀects. Time
eﬀects can arise, for example, from changes in market structure (e.g., transaction costs or
information) or because investors use past returns to forecast future expected returns. Cohort
eﬀects can be due to diﬀerences in life time earnings potential, or diﬀerent institutional
settings (e.g., the social security system). Since age (a), time (t), and cohort (c,b i r t h
year) are linearly dependent (a ≡ t − c), when constructing age proﬁles, it is impossible to
simultaneously identify time and cohort eﬀects.
[Figure 1A here]
[Figure 1B here]
Figure 1A plots the average life cycle equity holdings for stock market participants (as
a share of total ﬁnancial wealth), based on the 1989, 1992, 1995, and 1998 samples of the
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). Although the life cycle proﬁles are very sensitive to
the inclusion of time dummies versus the inclusion of cohort dummies, the average stock
7holdings are signiﬁcantly below 100% in both cases.8 Figure 1B plots the corresponding
stock market participation rate, obtained by running a probit regression on the same data.
These results are less sensitive to the choice of time versus cohort dummies. As expected, a
very large fraction of the population does not own equities. In both cases the participation
rate gradually increases until approximately age 50. When including cohort dummies, the
proﬁle is ﬂat after age 50, while with time dummies it is decreasing. Ameriks and Zeldes
(2001) obtain the same results after re-doing the analysis using TIAA-CREF data from 1987
to 1996, and so do Poterba and Samwick (1999), using SCF data.
We can summarize the existing evidence as follows.9 First, the stock market participation
rate in the U.S. population is close to 50%. Using the latest numbers from the SCF we
compute it as 51.9% (details given in Appendix C). Second, participation rates increase
during working life and there is some evidence suggesting that they might decrease during
retirement, although this might also be due to cohort eﬀects. Third, conditional on stock
market participation, households invest a large fraction of their ﬁnancial wealth in alternative
assets. According to the latest numbers from the SCF, the average equity holdings as a share
of ﬁnancial wealth for stock market participants is 54.8%. Fourth, there is no clear pattern
of equity holdings over the life cycle.
II. The Model
A. Preferences
Time is discrete and t denotes adult age, which following the typical convention in this
literature, corresponds to eﬀective age minus 19. Each period corresponds to one year
and agents live for a maximum of 81 (T)p e r i o d s( a g e100). The probability that a con-
8sumer/investor is alive at time (t +1 )conditional on being alive at time t is denoted by pt
(p0 equal to 1).
Households have Epstein-Zin utility functions (Epstein and Zin (1989)) deﬁned over one
single non durable consumption good. Let Ct and Xt denote respectively consumption level
and wealth (cash on hand) at time t. Then, the household’s preferences are deﬁned by















where ρ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, ψ is the elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution, β is the discount factor, and b determines the strength of the bequest motive.10






B. Labor Income Process
Following the standard speciﬁcation in the literature, the labor income process before
retirement is given by
Yit = PitUit (3)
Pit =e x p ( f(t,Zit))Pit−1Nit, (4)
where f(t,Zit) is a deterministic function of age and household characteristics Zit, Pit is a
permanent component with innovation Nit,a n dUit is a transitory component. We assume
that lnUit and lnNit are independent and identically distributed with mean {−.5∗σ2
u,−.5∗
σ2
n}, and variances σ2
u and σ2
n, respectively. The log of Pit e v o l v e sa sar a n d o mw a l kw i t ha
deterministic drift, f(t,Zit).
9For simplicity, retirement is assumed to be exogenous and deterministic, with all house-
holds retiring in time period K, corresponding to age 65 (K =4 6 ). Earnings in retirement
(t>K ) are given by Yit = λPiK, where λ is the replacement ratio (a scalar between zero
and one). This speciﬁcation, also standard in this literature, considerably facilitates the
solution of the model, as it does not require the introduction of an additional state variable
(see Section II.E).
Durable goods, and in particular housing, can provide an incentive for higher spending
early in life. Modeling these decisions directly is beyond the scope of the paper, but nev-
ertheless we take into account these potential patterns in life cycle expenditures. Using the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, for each age (t) we estimate the percentage of household
income that is dedicated to housing expenditures (ht) and subtract it from the measure of
disposable income.11 M o r ed e t a i l so nt h i se s t i m a t i o na r eg i v e nb e l o w ,w h e nw ed i s c u s st h e
calibration of the model.
C. Financial Assets
The investment opportunity set is constant and there are two ﬁnancial assets, one riskless
(Treasury bills or cash) and one risky (stocks). The riskless asset yields a constant gross
return, Rf, while the return on the risky asset (denoted by RS




f = µ + εt+1, (5)
where εt ∼ N(0,σ 2
ε).
We allow for positive correlation between stock returns and earnings shocks. We let φN
(φU)d e n o t et h ec o r r e l a t i o nc o e ﬃcient between stock returns and permanent (transitory)
income shocks.
10Before investing in stocks for the ﬁrst time, the investor must pay a ﬁx e dl u m ps u mc o s t ,
F ∗Pit. This entry fee represents both the explicit transaction cost from opening a brokerage
account and the (opportunity) cost of acquiring information about the stock market. The
ﬁxed cost (F) is scaled by the level of the permanent component of labor income (Pit),a s
this signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes the solution of the model. However, this speciﬁcation is also
motivated by the interpretation of the entry fee as the opportunity cost of time.
D. Wealth Accumulation
We denote cash on hand as the liquid resources available for consumption and saving.
We deﬁne a dummy variable IP that is equal to one when the ﬁxed entry cost is incurred





f +( 1− ht)Yi,t+1 − FIPPi,t+1, (6)
where Sit and Bit denote respectively stock holdings, and riskless asset holdings (cash) at
time t,a n dht is the fraction of income dedicated to housing-related expenditures. Since the
household must allocate cash on hand (Xit) between consumption expenditures (Cit)a n d
s a v i n g sw ea l s oh a v e
Xit = Cit + Sit + Bit (7)
Finally, we prevent households from borrowing against their future labor income. More
speciﬁcally we impose the following restrictions:
Bit ≥ 0 (8)
Sit ≥ 0. (9)
11E. The Optimization Problem and Solution Method
The complete optimization problem is then
MAX{Sit,Bit}T
t=1E(V0), (10)
where V0 is given by equations (1) and (2) and is subject to the constraints given by equations
(5) to (9), and to the stochastic labor income process given by (3) and (4) if t 6 K,a n d
Yit = λPiK if t>K .
Analytical solutions to this problem do not exist. We therefore use a numerical solution
method based on the maximization of the value function to derive the optimal decision rules.
The details are given in Appendix A, and here we just present the main idea. We ﬁrst simplify
the solution by exploiting the scale-independence of the maximization problem and rewriting
all variables as ratios to the permanent component of labor income (Pit).T h el a w so fm o t i o n
a n dt h ev a l u ef u n c t i o nc a nt h e nb er e w r i t t e ni nt e r m so ft h en o r m a l i z e dv a r i a b l e s ,a n dw e
use lowercase letters to denote them (for instance, xit ≡
Xit
Pit ). This allows us to reduce the
number of state variables to three: age (t), normalized cash on hand (xit) and participation
status (whether the ﬁxed cost has already been paid or not). In the last period, the policy
functions are determined by the bequest motive and the value function corresponds to the
bequest function. We can now use this value function to compute the policy rules for the
previous period, and given these, obtain the corresponding value function. This procedure
is then iterated backwards.
F. Computing Transition Distributions
After solving for the optimal policy functions, we can simulate the model to replicate
the behavior of a large number of households and compute, for example, the corresponding
12average allocations. Here we propose an alternative method of computing various statistics
that is based on the explicit calculation of the transition distribution of cash on hand from
one age to the next. The computational details are given in Appendix B, but the intuitive
idea is straightforward. Once we have solved for the policy functions, we can substitute those
in the budget constraint to obtain the distribution of xt+1 as a function of xt.D o i n gt h i sf o r
every possible xt,w ea r ee ﬀectively computing the full transition matrix.12





















where J is the number of grid points used in the discretization of normalized cash on hand,
and πI
t,j and πO
t,j are the probability masses associated with each grid point at time t,f o r
stockholders and non stockholders, respectively. The participation rate at age t (θt)i sg i v e n
by






where x∗ is the trigger point that causes participation, which is determined endogenously
through the participation decision rule.
Finally, if we use αt to denote the share of liquid wealth invested in the stock market at









t,j ∗ (xj − cI(xj,t))] + (1 − θt) ∗
PJ
j=1[πO




We start by presenting results for a relatively standard choice, (risk aversion) ρ equal to
ﬁve, (EIS) ψ =0 .2, and (discount factor) β =0 .96. However, later on we report results for
several diﬀerent values of both the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (ρ) and the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution (ψ), as these parameters have very important implications for
our results. We use the mortality tables of the National Center for Health Statistics to
parameterize the conditional survival probabilities.
T h ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h eb e q u e s tm o t i v e( b) is set at 2.5. As we discuss below, this para-
meter choice is motivated by the desire to match the wealth accumulation proﬁles observed
in the data, but we present some sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter.
G.II. Labor Income Process
The deterministic labor income proﬁle (f(t,Zit) reﬂects the hump shape of earnings over
the life cycle, and the corresponding parameter values, just like the retirement transfers (λ),
are taken from Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (1999). With respect to standard deviations
of the idiosyncratic shocks, the estimates range from 0.35 for σu and 0.12 for σn (Cocco,
Gomes and Maenhout) to 0.1 for σu and 0.08 for σn (Carroll (1992)). We use numbers
similar to the ones in Gourinchas and Parker (2002): σu =0 .15 and σn =0 .1.I ti sc o m m o n
practice to estimate diﬀerent labor income proﬁles for diﬀerent education groups (college
graduates, high school graduates, households without a high school degree). In our paper
we only report the results obtained with the parameters estimated from the sub sample of
high school graduates, as the results for the other two groups are very similar.
14G.III. Asset Returns, Correlation and Fixed Cost
The constant net real interest rate (Rf−1) is set at 2%, while for the stock return process
we consider a mean equity premium (µ) equal to 4% and a standard deviation (σε)o f1 8 % .
Considering an equity premium of 4% (as opposed to the historical 6%) is a fairly common
choice in this literature (e.g. Yao and Zhang (forthcoming), Cocco (2001) or Campbell et
al. (2001)). Even after having paid the ﬁxed entry cost, the average retail investor still faces
non trivial transaction costs, mostly in the form of mutual fund fees. This adjustment is a
short-cut representation for those costs, since the dimensionality of the problem prevents us
from modeling them explicitly (as in Heaton and Lucas (1996), for example).
The evidence on the magnitude of the correlation between stock returns and permanent
l a b o ri n c o m es h o c k si sm i x e d . 14 Davis and Willen (2001) and Heaton and Lucas (2000) do
not distinguish between the two components of labor income (permanent and transitory)
when computing the correlation coeﬃcients. For the purposes of calibrating our model, we
need to know the magnitude of the correlation coeﬃcient for these two shocks separately.
Campbell et al. (2001) estimate the correlation between the permanent component of labor
income shocks and stock returns, and obtain a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.15.15 They do
not estimate a correlation between transitory shocks and stock returns and just assume it
to be equal to zero. We use these numbers (φN =0 .15 and φU =0 .0)f o ro u rb e n c h m a r k
calibration, and perform sensitivity analysis around these values.
With respect to the ﬁxed cost of participation we consider two limit cases: one where the
cost is zero, and one where it equals 0.025 (2.5% of the household’s expected annual income).
This parameter reﬂects both the monetary cost associated with the initial investment in the
15stock market, and the opportunity cost associated with obtaining the necessary information
for making such investment.16
G.IV. Housing Expenditures
We measure housing expenditures using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
from 1976 until 1993.17 For each household, in each year, we compute the ratio of annual
mortgage payments and rent payments (housing related expenditures - H) relative to annual





We combine mortgage payments and rent together, since we are not modeling the housing
decision explicitly. We identify the age eﬀects by running the following regression on the full
panel:
hit = A + B1 ∗ age + B2 ∗ age
2 + B3 ∗ age
3 + time dummies + ζit, (15)
where age is deﬁned as the age of the head of the household. We eliminate all observations
with age greater than 75.18 The estimation results are reported in Table I.
[Table I here]
In the model we use
ht = Max(A + B1 ∗ age + B2 ∗ age
2 + B3 ∗ age
3,0), (16)
which, given our parameter estimates, truncates ht at zero for age > 80.
16III. Results without the Fixed Participation Cost
A. Consumption and Wealth Accumulation
Figure 2A plots mean normalized consumption (ct), mean normalized wealth (wt), and
mean normalized income net of housing expenditures ((1−ht)∗yt) .T h ep r e f e r e n c ep a r a m e -
ters are ρ equal to ﬁve and ψ equal to 0.2, and the importance of the bequest motive (b)i ss e t
at 2.5. Early in life, the household is liquidity constrained and saves only a small buﬀer stock
of wealth. From approximately ages 30 to 35 onwards, she starts saving for retirement and
bequests, and wealth accumulation increases signiﬁcantly. During retirement, consumption
decreases as a result of the very high eﬀective discount rate (high mortality risk). Wealth
does not fall towards zero due to the presence of the bequest motive.19
[Figure 2A here]
Table II shows the mean consumption to wealth ratio for diﬀerent values of the preference
parameters. We report results for values of risk aversion between one and ﬁve and for values
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution between 0.2 and 0.8, since this is the range that
we consider in the remaining part of the paper, and it is consistent with existing empirical
evidence (see the discussion in Section IV.C.1). The top panel considers the ﬁrst adult
years (20 to 35) during which wealth accumulation is mostly driven by the precautionary
savings motive. As a result, the optimal consumption to wealth ratio is signiﬁcantly more
aﬀected by prudence than by the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). Since the
more risk-averse investors are also the more prudent ones, the consumption to wealth ratio
is a decreasing function of risk aversion. For very low values of risk aversion (close to 1),
C/X converges to the 100% limit imposed by the borrowing constraint.
17[Table II here]
The second panel of Table II summarizes the remaining pre-retirement period (36 to 65),
during which savings are now determined by the preference for low-frequency consumption
smoothing, while the bottom panel reports the results for the retirement period (66 to 100).
The results are qualitatively identical in both cases.20 The optimal consumption to wealth
ratio is driven by the trade-oﬀ between the (endogenous) expected return on invested wealth
and the discount rate, combined with the household’s sensitivity to these incentives (the
EIS). The less risk-averse households invest a larger fraction of their portfolio in stocks, and
therefore the expected return on their invested wealth is higher. Thus, since for a given ψ less
than one the income eﬀect dominates the substitution eﬀect, they have higher consumption
to wealth ratios. The same intuition explains why, for a given ρ, C/X is a decreasing function
of the EIS. However, for both the highest and lowest values of ρ that we consider, this pattern
becomes weaker. In the ﬁrst case, the expected return on invested wealth is very close to
the discount rate and the consumption to wealth ratio is almost independent of ψ.21 In the
second case, C/X is close to the 100% limit given by the borrowing constraint.
From the results in Table II we can conclude that for the range of values that we consider,
the consumption to wealth ratio is a decreasing function of both ρ and ψ at every stage of
the life cycle.
B. Asset Allocation
Figure 2B graphs the unconditional mean asset allocation in equities (αt)f o rt h es a m e
preference parameters as in ﬁgure 2A (ρ equal to ﬁve, ψ equal to 0.2,a n db equal to 2.5).
Even though earnings risk is uninsurable, cash is a closer substitute for future labor income
18than are stocks (see Heaton and Lucas (1997)). Young households are overinvested in their
human capital and view this non tradeable asset as an implicit riskless asset in their portfolio.
Given that the holdings of this relatively riskless asset are larger in the early part of the life
cycle, all young households participate in the stock market and they allocate most of their
ﬁnancial wealth to stocks.22 As retirement approaches, and ﬁnancial wealth increases relative
to the present value of future labor income, agents start investing in cash. When retirement
savings is at its peak, more than 50% of total wealth is now being invested in the riskless
asset.
[Figure 2B here]
During retirement, both future labor income (the present value of the pension transfers)
and ﬁnancial wealth are falling, so that the optimal asset allocation is determined by the
relative speed at which these two decrease. Naturally this depends both on the discount rate
(adjusted for the survival probabilities) and the strength of the bequest motive. Given our
parameter values, during most of the retirement period, future labor income and wealth decay
at similar rates, and as a result, the share of wealth invested in stocks remains approximately
constant.23
IV. Results with the Fixed Participation Cost
A. Baseline case
We start by reporting the results for the baseline preference parameters (ρ equal to ﬁve,
ψ equal to 0.2,a n db equal to 2.5). In the next sections we consider diﬀerent values.
19A.1. Participation Decision and Asset Allocation
The participation decision is determined by four factors. First, it is an increasing function
of wealth accumulation. Intuitively, households that accumulate more wealth over the life
cycle have a stronger incentive to enter the stock market. Second, for the same level of wealth
accumulation, participation is a positive function of the optimal share of wealth invested in
stocks. Third, since F is an one-time cost, participation is also a positive function of the
investment horizon. Fourth, since the cost must be paid at the time of entry, the likelihood
of participating in the stock market is a negative function of current marginal utility.
Figure 3A shows the stock market participation rate for the baseline preference parame-
ters. Since young households are liquidity constrained, their marginal utility is extremely
high, and as a result they do not participate in the stock market until suﬃcient wealth has
been accumulated. As we can see from Figure 3A, given these preference parameters, this
happens very fast and by age 25 the participation rate is almost 100%. As a result, the
average life cycle proﬁles of wealth accumulation, consumption, and equity shares are almost
identical to the ones obtained without the ﬁxed cost (reported in Figures 2A and 2B), and
are therefore omitted here.
[Figure 3A here]
A.2. Wealth Distributions
Figure 3B plots the evolution of the distributions of cash on hand for the two types
of agents: stock market participants and non participants at age 30, still with ρ equal to
ﬁve and ψ equal to 0.2. There is a pronounced spike around the normalized cash-on-hand
20level of 0.75; beyond that level, stock market participation becomes optimal and the two
distributions overlap for a small interval, mostly representing the incurrence of the ﬁxed
entry cost. Figure 3C plots the distributions of cash on hand for ages 50 for both types of
agents. Conditional on age, the distribution of cash on hand for stock holders has a much
higher variance than the wealth distribution for the households that have not participated




Next we perform some sensitivity analysis with respect to the importance of the bequest
motive. Figure 3D plots wealth accumulation for diﬀerent values of the parameter b, while
ﬁgure 3E plots the corresponding conditional asset allocations. A stronger bequest motive
increases wealth accumulation at every stage of the life cycle, and the eﬀect is strongest
during retirement. The increase in wealth accumulation leads to a modest reduction in the
share of equity investment during working life. Since both of these eﬀects have a fairly
modest impact until retirement, the implied participation rates are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected
and therefore we do not report them. During retirement, an increase in the bequest motive
decreases the speed at which wealth is being drawn down, and leads to a higher ratio of
ﬁnancial wealth to labor income. As a result, for a given age, a stronger (weaker) bequest
motive decreases (increases) the optimal equity share.
[Figure 3D here]
21[Figure 3E here]
As mentioned before, the empirical evidence is mixed on the magnitude of the correlation
coeﬃcients between stock returns and the diﬀerent labor income shocks (transitory and
permanent). In our baseline calibration, we have assumed φN equal to 0.15 and φU equal to
0.0, following the estimation of Campbell et al. (2001). In Figure 3F we now check whether
the results are sensitive to these values. We only report the asset allocation decisions, since
the participation decision is almost identical in all cases.
[Figure 3F here]
Campbell et al. (2001) do not actually estimate φU equal to 0.0; they just assume it.
Therefore, in our ﬁrst experiment, we allow for a positive correlation between stock returns
and the transitory labor income shocks, in particular we consider φN equal to 0.15 and φU
equal to 0.1. The results are very similar to the ones obtained for the baseline case. In the
second experiment, we now set φN =0 .0 and assume that the correlation is instead driven
exclusively by the transitory shocks, thus setting φU equal to 0.15. We again obtain results
that are extremely close to our baseline case. The share invested in equities is higher, but
only marginally so. Finally, we consider the case in which there is no correlation between
stock returns and labor income shocks. Only in this case do we ﬁnd a visible diﬀerence
relative to the benchmark calibration, as investors now allocate a higher fraction of their
wealth to equities.
So far we have assumed that all households start at age 20 with zero initial wealth. Table
III reports summary statistics for the wealth distribution for households of age 20 (or lower)
22from the Survey of Consumer Finances (details given in Appendix C). When we use this
distribution as the initial condition in our model, with the exception of the ﬁrst few years,
the wealth proﬁles are virtually indistinguishable and therefore we do not report them.24
This result occurs because young households are liquidity constrained and they therefore
prefer to consume all of this additional wealth rather than save it.
[Table III here]
In our baseline calibration we assume that housing expenditures constitute a ﬁxed pro-
portion of labor income. We now allow for a stochastic component in this ratio. More
precisely, disposable income is now given by (1 −e ht)Yi,t+1,w h e r e




t follows a normal distribution with zero mean and variance σ2
εh.
In this experiment we set σεh equal to 0.25.T h i se ﬀectively corresponds to an increase
in the level of background risk, and it is equivalent to an increase in the variance of the
transitory labor income shocks. We ﬁnd that the results are quite similar to the baseline
case and therefore we do not report them. The increase in background risk reduces the
willingness to invest in stocks, but since these are transitory shocks, the eﬀe c ti sn o tv e r y
large. For the same reason, the wealth accumulation and the participation rate are almost
unaﬀected.
B. Changing Risk Aversion and the Impact of Background Risk
The stock market participation rate implied by the baseline parameters is counterfactually
high. In this section, we explore the model’s ability to produce more realistic results by
23considering diﬀerent preference parameter values. As mentioned before, the participation
decision is an increasing function of both wealth (X) and the optimal share of wealth invested
in risky assets (α). Decreasing risk aversion increases the optimal share invested in stocks,
but as shown in Section III.A, it also decreases wealth accumulation at every stage of the
life cycle. Therefore, the impact on the participation decision resulting from changes in risk
aversion, depends on which of these two eﬀects dominates.
B.1. Wealth Accumulation
We start by decreasing ρ from ﬁve to two, while maintaining the power utility assumption,
thus increasing the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (ψ)t o0.5.I nﬁgure 4A we plot
the wealth accumulation for this case and for the baseline parameter values (ρ equal to ﬁve, ψ
equal to 0.2,a n db equal to 2.5). As expected, wealth accumulation is signiﬁcantly reduced
at every stage of the life cycle. As previously shown in Section III.A (see Table II), the
average consumption to wealth ratio is now 86% for the age group 20 to 35,a n d3 5 %f o rt h e
age group 36 to 65, as opposed to 66% and 19% respectively.
[Figure 4A here]
H o w e v e r ,f r o mt h er e s u l t si nT a b l eI I ,w ek n o wt h a ti fw ed e p a r tf r o mp o w e ru t i l i t ya n d
decrease both risk aversion (ρ)a n dt h eE I S( ψ) simultaneously, this signiﬁcantly reduces
wealth accumulation. Consider then decreasing ρ to two, but now keeping ψ at 0.2.T h e
consumption to wealth ratio for the ﬁrst age group is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected (90% instead
of 86%) since, at this stage of the life cycle, savings are essentially driven by prudence (which
remains constant). However, for the second age group, wealth accumulation is determined
24mostly by the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. As a result, the average consumption
to wealth ratio is now almost doubled, increasing from 35% to 67%. As shown in ﬁgure 4A,
this leads to a very signiﬁcant reduction in life cycle wealth accumulation.
B.2. Stock Market Participation Rates and Asset Allocation
Figure 4B plots the participation rates for diﬀerent values of risk aversion, with the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution equal to 0.2.G i v e n t h e l a r g e d i ﬀerences in wealth
accumulation, it is not surprising that the wealth eﬀect dominates with respect to the par-
ticipation decision. The less prudent households save less, and as a result, their participation
rate is smaller. While almost all high prudence households have already paid the ﬁxed cost
by age 25, only 75% of the households with ρ equal to two have done so, although by age
35, even all of these investors have already paid the ﬁxed cost as well. However, from the
less risk-averse households (i.e., ρ equal to 1.2), only a very small fraction (less than 20%)
will ever invest in stocks. On the other hand, as shown in Figure 4C, the reduction in risk




B.3. The Impact of Background Risk
The previous results illustrate one important trade-oﬀ generated by the level of back-
ground risk. When faced with more background risk (for example, due to more labor income
risk, consumption risk, or housing/mortgage risk) agents invest a smaller fraction of their
25ﬁnancial wealth in risky assets. However, they also accumulate a larger buﬀer stock of
wealth, and thus have a stronger incentive to enter the stock market. We have considered
three diﬀerent experiments in which we have increased the investor’s background risk. In
the ﬁrst two we have assumed a higher variance of respectively transitory and permanent
labor income shocks, and in the third we have included a positive probability of a disastrous
l a b o ri n c o m es h o c k .F i g u r e4 Ds h o w st h er e s u l t sf o rt h ec a s eo ft h eﬁrst experiment, where
the variance of the transitory labor income shocks was increased by a factor of three.26 As
expected, background risk crowds out stock holdings and households invest a smaller fraction
of their portfolios in equities. However, they also increase their buﬀer stock of wealth, and
as a result the stock market participation rate is higher than before.
[Figure 4D here]
C. Asset Allocation and Participation Rates with Preference Heterogeneity
C.1. Matching Participation Rates and Conditional Asset Allocations
Given our previous results, we can simultaneously match stock market participation rates
and asset allocation conditional on participation with moderate degrees of risk aversion, if
we allow for preference heterogeneity. Households with very low risk aversion and low EIS
smooth idiosyncratic earnings shocks with a small buﬀer stock of assets, and most of them
never invest in equities (thus behaving as in the Deaton (1991) inﬁnite horizon model). This
seems to describe adequately the behavior of a large fraction of the U.S. population that
retires without signiﬁcant ﬁnancial assets (and does not participate in the stock market).
Within the low EIS and low risk-aversion group, only a small fraction of them owns stocks,
26and they do so only as they get close to retirement. On the other hand, investors with high
prudence and high EIS are the ones who participate in the stock market from early on, since
they accumulate more wealth and therefore have a stronger incentive to pay the ﬁxed cost.
Therefore, the marginal stockholders are (endogenously) more risk averse, and as a result
they do not invest their portfolios fully in stocks.
In this ﬁnal section we try to evaluate how much heterogeneity we need to match the data.
In other words, can the model consistently explain the two facts for a plausible distribution
of preference parameters across the population? Table IV reports participation rates and
average equity shares for stock market participants, for diﬀerent distributions, and compares
them with the empirical evidence from the SCF. We ﬁrst consider a 50% split between
investors with both low risk aversion and low EIS (ρ equal to 1.2 and ψ equal to 0.2), and
investors with moderate risk aversion and moderate EIS (ρ equal to ﬁve and ψ equal to 0.5).
The model gives a participation rate of 52.1% and an equity share of 54.5% for stock market
participants (Case 1 in Table IV), which matches fairly well with the empirical evidence
reported in Section I (and summarized in the ﬁrst row of Table IV).
[Table IV here]
It is important to mention that this form of heterogeneity is consistent with the existing
empirical evidence. Attanasio, Banks, and Tanner (2002) show that the CRRA coeﬃcient
is much higher (thus much lower EIS) for non stockholders than for stockholders. Vissing-
Jørgensen (2002a) focuses on this distinction and argues that “accounting for limited asset
market participation is crucial for obtaining consistent estimates of the EIS” (p. 827).
Vissing-Jørgensen then obtains estimates of the EIS greater than 0.3 for risky asset holders,
27while for the remaining households the EIS estimates are small and insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio (2003) further stress that loosening the link
between risk aversion and intertemporal substitution can generate implications about the
covariance of stock returns and individual consumption growth for stockholders that are not
rejected in the data. They oﬀer risk aversion estimates for stockholders at around ﬁve to ten
and EIS estimates around one. Overall, the existing estimates of EIS and risk aversion are
consistent with the values that we use in this paper.
C.2. Life Cycle Proﬁles
We now report the life cycle proﬁles of stock market participation and asset allocation
implied by the model. As argued in Section I, in the data these proﬁles are not very robust
to speciﬁc assumptions about cohort or time eﬀects (see ﬁgures 1A and 1B). As a result, in
this paper we have focused mostly on life cycle averages.
Figure 5A plots the stock market participation rate implied by the model for diﬀerent
age groups, together with the corresponding numbers from the SCF (see Appendix C for
details), while Figure 5B does the same, but now for the average asset allocation of stock
market participants. The participation rates are extremely similar, with the largest diﬀerence
occurring at retirement when the participation rate in the data declines, while it remains
constant in the model. However, as shown in Figure 1B, this is exactly one of the results
that is not robust to the assumption of cohort dummies versus time dummies. With respect
to the asset allocation decisions, we do observe a more signiﬁcant diﬀerence, in this case for
young households. In the model, these agents invest a signiﬁcant fraction of their portfolio
in equities, while in the data, regardless of the controls, this does not happen.
28[Figure 5A here]
[Figure 5B here]
C.3. Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness
So far we have assumed that households start at age 20 with zero initial wealth, since
we have seen in Section IV.A.3 that, for ρ equal to ﬁve, using the initial wealth distribution
calibrated from the SCF does not aﬀect the results. However, this might not be case for
investors with low risk aversion and low EIS, since they save very little. By giving these
households some positive initial wealth, we are likely to see an increase in stock market
p a r t i c i p a t i o nr a t e s .I nt h et h i r dr o wo fT a b l eI V( C a s e2 )w es h o wt h a tt h i se ﬀe c ti sn o tt o o
large, and we can replicate the previous results by considering a slightly lower value of risk
aversion (1.1).27
I ti si m p o r t a n tt op o i n to u tt h a tw ed on o tn e e dt oa s s u m eav e r yl o wv a l u eo ft h eE I S
to generate large non participation, since we can compensate for a higher ψ by decreasing
risk aversion even further. This is shown in the fourth row of Table IV (Case 3), where we
ﬁxt h eE I Sc o e ﬃcient equal to 0.5 for both types of investors. To reproduce the results in
the ﬁrst panel, we ﬁnd that we need to decrease ρ to 1.07 for the less risk-averse group.
Given our previous discussion, we know that households with risk aversion between 1.5
and 4 tend to participate in the stock market from early on, and invest almost all of their
wealth in stocks. Naturally, it is not reasonable to assume that the distribution of coeﬃcients
of risk aversion mysteriously collapses to the two extremes that we have previously considered
(1.2 and 5). In the ﬁfth row of Table IV (we now consider a smoother distribution, with ρ
ranging from one to ﬁv e( C a s e4 ) . I ti si m p o r t a n tt op o i n to u tt h a tt h i si sn o tau n i f o r m
29distribution, as there is a slightly higher fraction of less risk-averse households. If we want
to match both facts simultaneously, with a (relatively) smooth distribution, we need it to
exhibit some negative skewness. As predicted, both the participation rate and the equity
share are now higher than before, but not signiﬁcantly so. The equity share is now 57%,
while the participation rate is also equal to 57%, numbers that are still extremely close to
the empirical evidence (row 1).
D. Wealth Distribution
In this section we compare the wealth accumulation predicted by the model with the
empirical evidence in the SCF. Given the (exogenous) diﬀerences in the preference parameters
and the (endogenous) diﬀerences in the participation decision, our model generates a large
degree of heterogeneity in wealth accumulation. To illustrate, we compare both median
wealth accumulation and the extremes of the distribution (percentiles 10 and 90) to see if
the model generates the degree of heterogeneity observed in the SCF. We divide households
into the three usual age groups: buﬀer stock savers (20 to 35), retirement savers (36 to 65)
and retirees (over 66).
The results are shown in Table V. The model can replicate the low wealth accumulation
patterns of the poorer households in the data. Households with the lowest income realiza-
tions tend not to participate in the stock market and accumulate very little wealth over the
life cycle. This is consistent with the results in Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995), who
illustrate in a similar model how the presence of social insurance (pensions) can crowd out
private saving over the life cycle for the poorest quintile of the wealth distribution. Nev-
ertheless, in the SCF these households still accumulate some non-negligible wealth during
30retirement, something that does not happen in the model. For the median household, the
model does quite well early in life; it overshoots for the second age group; and it undershoots
at retirement. Finally, at the high end of the distribution we can generate extremely large
wealth accumulation, although not quite as high as in the data. This diﬀerence is most
signiﬁcant during the retirement period and early in life. Overall the degree of heterogeneity
in the wealth distribution is comparable to the one observed in the data. The model consis-
tently generates low wealth accumulation at retirement, which would suggest the presence of
a stronger bequest motive, but as shown in Section IV.A.3, a stronger bequest motive also
increases wealth accumulation at mid life (ﬁgure 3D).
[Table V here]
In the ﬁnal panel of Table V we simulate the model with the initial distribution of wealth
calibrated from the SCF. The results are almost identical to the previous ones, with a minor
increase in wealth accumulation at the 90 percentile.
V. Conclusion
In this paper we present a life cycle asset allocation model with realistically calibrated
uninsurable labor income risk that provides an explanation for two very important empirical
observations: low stock market participation rates in the population as a whole, and mod-
erate equity holdings for stock market participants. We do not rely on high values of risk
aversion, or on extreme assumptions about background risk.
In our model, households with very low risk aversion and low EIS accumulate very little
wealth and as a result, most of them never invest in equities. On the other hand, the more
31prudent investors are the ones who participate in the stock market from early on, as they
accumulate more wealth and therefore have a stronger incentive to pay the ﬁxed entry cost.
Therefore, the marginal stockholders are (endogenously) more risk averse and as a result
they do not invest their portfolios fully in stocks. On the negative side, the model still
counterfactually predicts that young households that have already paid the participation
cost invest most of their portfolio in equities.
32Appendix A: Numerical Solution Method
We ﬁrst simplify the solution by exploiting the scale-independence of the maximization
problem and rewriting all variables as ratios to the permanent component of labor income
(Pit). The laws of motion and the value function can then be rewritten in terms of these
normalized variables, and we use lowercase letters to denote them (for instance, xit ≡
Xit
Pit ).
This allows us to reduce the number of state variables to three: one continuous state variable
(cash on hand, xit) and two discrete state variables (age, t, and participation status, whether
the ﬁxed cost has been paid or not). We discretize the state space along the cash on hand
dimension (the only continuous state variable), so that the relevant policy functions can now
be represented on a numerical grid.
We solve the model using backward induction. For every age t prior to T,a n df o re a c h
point in the state space, we optimize using grid search. So we need to compute the value
associated with each level of consumption, the decision to pay the ﬁx e dc o s t ,a n dt h es h a r e
of liquid wealth invested in stocks. From the Bellman equation, these values are given as
current utility plus the discounted expected continuation value (EtVt+1(.,.)), which we can
compute once we have obtained Vt+1. In the last period the policy functions are determined
by the bequest motive and the value function corresponds to the bequest function, regardless
of whether the ﬁxed cost has been paid before or not. This gives us the terminal condition
for our backward induction procedure. We perform all numerical integrations using Gaussian
quadrature to approximate the distributions of the innovations to the labor income process
and the risky asset returns. For points which do not lie on state space grid, we evaluate the
value function using a cubic spline interpolation.
33Once we have computed the value of all the alternatives, we just pick the maximum,
thus obtaining the policy rules for the current period (St and Bt). At each point of the state
space, the participation decision is computed by comparing the value function conditional on
having paid the ﬁxed cost (adjusting for the payment of the cost itself) with the value function
conditional on non payment. Substituting these decision rules in the Bellman equation, we
obtain this period’s value function (Vt(.,.)) ,w h i c hi st h e nu s e dt os o l v et h ep r e v i o u sp e r i o d ’ s
maximization problem. This process is iterated until t =1 .
34Appendix B: Computing the Transition Distributions
To ﬁnd the distribution of cash on hand, we ﬁrst compute the relevant optimal policy
rules: bond and stock policy functions for stock market participants and non participants
and the {0,1} participation rule as a function of cash on hand. Let bI(x) and sI(x) denote
respectively the bonds and stock policy rules for individuals participating in the stock market,
and let bO(x) be the savings decision for the individual out of the stock market. We assume
that households start their working lives with zero liquid assets. During working lives, for
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+( 1− ht+1)Ut+1, (A1)
where w(x) is deﬁned by the last equality and is conditional on { Pt
Pt+1} and the determin-
istically evolving
exp(f(t,Zt))
exp(f(t+1,Zt+1)). Denote the transition matrix of moving from xj to xk,29
conditional on not having paid the ﬁxed cost, as TO
kj. Let ∆ denote the distance between the
equally spaced discrete points of cash on hand. The random permanent shock Pt
Pt+1 is dis-
cretized using Gaussian quadrature with H points: Pt
Pt+1 = {Nm}m=H
m=1 . TO



































Making use of the approximation that for small values of σ2
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where Φ is the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal. The unconditional









Given the transition matrix TO (letting the number of cash-on-hand grid points equal to J,
this is a J by J matrix; TO
kj represents the {kth,jth} element), the next period probabilities











We next use the vector ΠO
t ( t h i si saJ by 1 vector representing the mass of the population
out of the stock market at each grid point; πO
kt represents the {kth} element at time t)a n d
the participation policy rule to determine the percentage of households that optimally choose
to incur the ﬁxed cost and invest in risky assets. This is found by computing the sum of the
probabilities in ΠO
t for which x>x ∗, x∗ being the trigger point that causes participation
(x∗ is determined endogenously through the participation decision rule). These probabilities
are then deleted from ΠO
t a n da r ea d d e dt oΠI
t, appropriately renormalizing both {ΠO
t ,ΠI
t}
to sum to one. The participation rate (θt) can be computed at this stage as






36The same methodology (but with more algebra and computations) can then be used to
derive the transition distribution for cash on hand conditional on having paid the ﬁxed cost,
TI




















+( 1− ht+1)Ut+1, (A8)
where w(x) is now conditional on {RS
t+1, Pt
Pt+1}31. The random processes RS
t+1and Pt
Pt+1 are
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where Pr(RS
l ) and Pr(Nn) stand respectively for Pr(RS
t+1 = RS






where the independence between Pt
Pt+1 and RS






















The transition probability conditional on Nn, RS
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37Appendix C: Survey of Consumer Finances Data
The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) is probably the most comprehensive source
of data on U.S. household assets. The SCF uses a two-part sampling strategy to obtain
as u ﬃciently large and unbiased sample of wealthier households (the rich sample is chosen
randomly using tax reports). To enhance the reliability of the data, the SCF makes weighting
adjustments for survey non respondents; these weights were used in computing the values
reported in the tables. The speciﬁc names in the codebook for the variables used are given
below.
We construct a measure of labor income that matches as closely as possible the process
for Yit (earnings) in the text. We therefore deﬁn el a b o ri n c o m ea st h es u mo fw a g e sa n d
salaries (X5702), unemployment or worker’s compensation (X5716) and Social Security or
other pensions, annuities, or other disability or retirement programs (X5722). Liquid wealth
is variable FIN in the publicly available SCF data set, to which home equity was added.
Variable FIN is made up of LIQ (all types of transaction accounts (checking, saving, money
market, and call accounts)), CDS (certiﬁcates of deposit), total directly held mutual funds,
stocks, bonds, total quasi-liquid ﬁnancial assets (the sum of IRAs, thrift accounts, and
future pensions), savings bonds, the cash value of whole life insurance, other managed assets
(trusts, annuities, and managed investment accounts in which the household has equity
interest) and other ﬁnancial assets: this includes loans from the household to someone else,
future proceeds, royalties, futures, non public stock, and deferred compensation. We deﬁne
h o m ee q u i t ya st h ev a l u eo ft h eh o m el e s st h ea m o u n ts t i l lo w e do nt h eﬁrst and second/third
m o r t g a g e sa n dt h ea m o u n to w e do nh o m ee q u i t yl i n e so fc r e d i t .T h i sd e ﬁnition of wealth is
38consistent with both the deﬁnitions in Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) and in Heaton
and Lucas (2000).
Financial assets invested in the risky asset can be directly held stock, stock mutual
funds, or amounts of stock in retirement accounts. We follow the procedures the SCF uses
to construct this number for each household (variable EQUITY). Speciﬁcally, this is done
by computing the full value of stocks, adding the full value if an asset is described as a
stock mutual fund, and half the value if the asset refers to a combination of mutual funds.
For this purpose, IRAs/Keoghs invested in stock are computed by adding the full value
if mostly invested in stock, half the value if split between stocks/bonds or stocks/money
market, and one-third of the value if split between stocks/bonds/money market. We also
add other managed assets with equity interest (annuities, trusts, and MIAs) by adding
the full value if mostly invested in stock, half the value if split between stocks/MFs &
bonds/CDs, or “mixed/diversiﬁed” and one third of the value if “other.” We also add thrift-
type retirement accounts invested in stock: the full value if mostly invested in stock and
half the value if split between stocks and interest earning assets. Stock market participation
is then determined by checking whether the full value of stocks (EQUITY) is greater than
zero (variable HEQUITY).
We construct the share of wealth in stocks conditional on HEQUITY being positive as
(EQUITY)/(FIN) where all the variables have been deﬁned above.
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46Footnotes
1See, for instance, Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995), Carroll (1997), Attanasio et
al. (1999), Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2002) and Cagetti
(2003).
2See, for example, Telmer (1993), Lucas (1994), Koo (1998), Heaton and Lucas (1996,
1997, and 2000), Polkovnichenko (2000), Viceira (2001), and Haliassos and Michaelides
(2003).
3See, for instance, Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (1999), Cocco (2000), Campbell et
al. (2001), Hu (2001), Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2001), Davis, Kubler, and Willen
(2002), Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang (2001, forthcoming), Polkovnichenko (2002), Yao and
Zhang (forthcoming), and Gomes and Michaelides (2003). Bertaut and Haliassos (1997)
and Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002) analyze three period models where each
period amounts to 20 years.
4See, among others, Constantinides (1986), Aiyagari and Gertler (1991), He and Modest
(1995), Saito (1995), Heaton and Lucas (1996), Luttmer (1996, 1999), Basak and Cuoco
(1998), and Vayanos (1998).
5It is important to point out that we do not need heterogeneity in the EIS to obtain
o u rr e s u l t s . A sw ew i l ls h o w ,t h el e s sr i s k - a v e r s ei n v e s t o r sc a nh a v et h es a m eE I Sa st h e
more risk-averse, just as long as this value is not too high (hence the need for Epstein-Zin
preferences).
6Hu (2001) and Yao and Zhang (2002) are able to reduce the equity demand of young
47households by considering models with an explict housing allocation decision.
7Guiso, Haliassos, and Japelli (2002) obtain similar conclusions using cross-sectional in-
formation for ﬁve diﬀerent countries (U.S., U.K., The Netherlands, Germany, and Italy).
8The OLS regression with cohort eﬀects predicts a share of ﬁnancial wealth invested in
stocks above 100% for the oldest age groups. This is just the result of imposing the same
cohort eﬀects on the full sample as in fact, in every individual cross-section, these age groups
never invests more than 60% of their wealth in equities.
9We must point out that several papers have contributed to this research. See, for example,
Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese (1996) (who focus mostly on the impact of background risk
on asset allocation), King and Leape (1998), Heaton and Lucas (2000) and the papers in the
volume edited by Guiso, Haliassos, and Japelli (2002).
10For more motivation and details on the modeling of bequest motives in life-cycle models
see Laitner (2002), or De Nardi (forthcoming).
11A similar approach is taken by Flavin and Yamashita (2002) in a model without labor
income.
12The results in the paper were computed both from the transition distributions and using
Monte Carlo simulations. The results were found to be identical, as long as the number of
simulations is not too small (2,000 or more).
13Superscript I denotes households participating in the stock market, while superscript O
d e n o t e sh o u s e h o l d so u to ft h es t o c km a r k e t .
4814Moreover, it has been argued that these estimations suﬀer from a small sample bias,
since the time-series dimension is too short in micro data, and estimations using macro data
usually yield larger and more signiﬁcant correlations (see, for example, Jermann (1999)).
15It is important to realize that in their tables, Campbell et al. (2001) actually report
the correlation of the aggregate component of permanent labor income shocks with stock
returns. This explains their high estimates: 45.6%. To obtain the correlation with the “total
permanent shock,” we need to adjust for the standard deviation of the aggregate component
relative to the total, which gives the 15% number.
16Consider the average household that has an annual labor income of $35,000.I ft h et i m e
cost were zero, then this value of F would imply a monetary cost of $875. If instead the
monetary cost were zero, then this would imply a time cost of 9.1 days (6.3 working days).
More generally, any convex combination of these two costs is acceptable, for example, a time
cost of one (two) day(s) and a monetary cost of $779 ($683). Paiella (2001) and Vissing-
Jørgensen (2002b) used Euler equation estimation methods to obtain implied participation
costs from observed consumption choices. They ﬁnd values in the $75 to $200 range, but these
are per-period costs, so our number is quite reasonable when compared to their estimates.
17Before 1976 there is no information on mortgage expenditures, and 1993 is the last year
available on ﬁnal release from the PSID.
18There are several reasons for eliminating these households. First, there are very few
observations within each age group beyond age 75. Second, for most of these households,
the values of hit are equal to zero. Third, this is consistent with the estimation procedure
49used for the labor income process.
19Net income increases during the ﬁrst years of retirement because the housing expendi-
tures (ht) are still positive and decreasing towards zero.
20The results are qualitatively similar to the ones obtained by Campbell and Viceira (1999)
in the context of an inﬁnite-horizon portfolio choice model without labor income and liquidity
constraints.
21As risk aversion increases further (not reported), the return on the portfolio falls below
the discount rate and the consumption to wealth ratio becomes an increasing function of the
EIS.
22During the very ﬁrst years of adult life households hold a small fraction of their wealth
in cash, since the present value of future labor income is actually still increasing.
23This is true, except during the last years, when most households have very little ﬁnancial
wealth left.
24In the implementation we truncate the distribution from the SCF at its 90 percentile.
25For ρ =1 .2, the conditional equity share is always 100%, and therefore it is not included
in the ﬁgure.
26The results for the other two cases are qualitatively identical, and they are available
upon request.
27Alternatively, we could consider a lower value of the EIS. With ψ =0 .1 we would again
obtain very similar results.
5028To avoid cumbersome notation, the subscript i that denotes a particular individual is
omitted in what follows.
29The normalized grid is discretized between (xmin,xmax) where xmin denotes the min-
imum point on the equally spaced grid and xmax denotes the maximum point.
30The dependence on the determinastically evolving
exp(f(t,Zt))
exp(f(t+1,Zt+1)) is implied and is omitted
from what follows for expositional clarity.
31The dependence on the non random earnings component is omitted to simplify notation.
32The methodology can be applied for an arbitrary correlation structure using the Choleski
decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of the innovations.
51Table I
This shows the regression of the ratio of housing expenditures to labor income (heit), on
age polynomials, and time dummies. The data are taken from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics from 1976 until 1993. For each household, in each year, we compute the ratio of
annual mortgage payments plus rent payments relative to annual labor income, and regress
this ratio against a constant, a cubic polynomial of age (where age is deﬁned as the age









This shows the average consumption-wealth ratio (C/X) implied by the no-ﬁxed cost
model for diﬀerent values of both the coeﬃcient of risk aversion (ρ) and the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution (ψ), and for diﬀerent age groups.
Age 20 until Age 35 Age 36 until Age 65 Age 66 until Age 100
ρψ =0 .8 ψ =0 .5 ψ =0 .2 ψ =0 .8 ψ =0 .5 ψ =0 .2 ψ =0 .8 ψ =0 .5 ψ =0 .2
1 98% 99% 99% 98% 99% 99% 100% 100% 100%
1.2 87% 92% 93% 43% 88% 94% 88% 100% 100%
2 76% 86% 90% 18% 35% 67% 25% 71% 97%
4 61% 67% 75% 14% 18% 27% 23% 29% 59%
5 55% 60% 66% 13% 16% 19% 25% 26% 47%
Table III
This shows the wealth distribution (wealth to income ratios) for households with head
aged 20 or less. The data are taken from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (details in
Appendix C). The variable X deﬁnes liquid wealth and Y denotes labor or pension income.
Decile 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
X/Y 0.000 0.015 0.043 0.113 0.167 0.236 0.267 0.406 0.863
53Table IV
This shows the average stock market participation rate (P)a n da v e r a g es t o c kh o l d i n g s
for stock market participants (αP). The ﬁrst row reports data from the 2001 Survey of
Consumer Finances (details in Appendix C), while the other four panels report the results
from the model for diﬀerent distributions of investors. Case 1 assumes two groups of agents,
(ρ =1 .2 and ψ =0 .2)a n d( ρ =5and ψ =0 .5), with 50% weight each. Case 2 also assumes
two groups of agents, but now (ρ =1 .1 and ψ =0 .2)a n d( ρ =5and ψ =0 .5), with 50%
weight each, and with the initial wealth distribution calibrated from the SCF. In Case 3 we
have again two groups, (ρ =1 .07 and ψ =0 .5)a n d( ρ =5and ψ =0 .5), with 50% weight
each. Finally, Case 4 considers three groups of agents, (ρ =1and ψ =0 .2)a n d( ρ =3and
ψ =0 .5)a n d( ρ =5and ψ =0 .5), with weights 40%, 30%,a n d30%, respectively.
P αP
Data 51.94% 54.76%
Model (Case 1) 52.14% 54.48%
Model (Case 2) 50.36% 53.32%
Model (Case 3) 54.42% 56.24%
Model (Case 4) 56.98% 56.56%
54Table V
This shows the distribution of wealth to labor income ratios from the 2001 Survey of
Consumer Finances for diﬀerent age groups (Appendix C provides more details) and for
two diﬀerent versions of the model: with zero initial wealth and with the initial wealth
distribution calibrated from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). Results are shown for
diﬀerent age groups.
Age Groups 20−35 36−65 >65
Data
10th Percentile 0.002 0.071 0.371
Median 0.287 2.170 7.931
90th Percentile 2.702 10.648 33.363
Model (zero initial wealth)
10th Percentile 0.006 0.005 0.006
Median 0.261 3.115 4.838
90th Percentile 0.748 8.184 17.539
Model (Initial Wealth from the SCF)
10th Percentile 0.006 0.005 0.006
Median 0.263 3.116 4.839
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Figure 1A. Equity holdings as a fraction of total financial wealth for stock 
market participants. The results are taken from Ameriks and Zeldes (2001), and 
they are obtained from OLS regressions with age dummies and either time or cohort 
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Figure 1B. Stock market participation rate. The results are taken from Ameriks 
and Zeldes (2001), and they are obtained from probit regressions with age dummies 
and either time or cohort dummies. The data includes the 1989, 1992, 1995, and 1998 













Figure 2A. Life cycle profiles of consumption, income and wealth for the baseline 
preference parameters: coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 5, elasticity of 
















































Figure 2B. Life cycle asset allocation for the baseline preference parameters: 
coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 5, elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
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Figure 3A. Stock market participation over the life cycle for the baseline 
preference parameters: coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 5, elasticity of 
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Dis Age 30 out of Stock Market Dis Age 30 in Stock Market
Figure 3B. Distributions for normalized cash on hand, at age 30, for the baseline 
preference parameters: coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 5, elasticity of 
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Figure 3C. Distributions for normalized cash on hand, at age 50, for the baseline 
preference parameters: coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 5, elasticity of 
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Figure 3D. Wealth accumulation for different values of the bequest parameter 
(b), and for the baseline preferences parameters: coefficient of relative risk 

































b=3.5 b=2.5 b=1.5 b=0.0
 
Figure 3E. Asset allocation for stock market participants, for different values of 
the bequest parameter (b), and for the baseline preference parameters: 
coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 5, elasticity of intertemporal substitution 













Figure 3F. Asset allocation for stock market participants, for different values of 
the correlation between stock returns and transitory (permanent) labor income 
shocks, denoted by corrt (corrp), with the baseline preference parameters: 
coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 5, elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
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Figure 4A. Wealth accumulation over the life cycle, for different values of the 
preference parameters (coefficient of relative risk aversion and elasticity of 
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Figure 4B. Stock market participation rate for different values of the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion (RRA), with elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
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Figure 4C. Asset allocation for stock market participants, for different values of 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA), with elasticity of intertemporal 
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Figure 4D. Stock market participation rate and share of wealth invested in 
stocks for different levels of background risk, with the baseline preferences: 
coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 5, elasticity of intertemporal substitution 







[20,34] [35,44] [45,54] [55,64] [65,74] [75,100]
Age Groups
Model Data
Figure 5A. Stock market participation rate implied by the heterogeneous agent 

















































Figure 5B. Asset allocation for stock market participants rate implied by the 
heterogeneous agent model and asset allocation for stock market participants 
from the 2001 sample of the Survey of Consumer Finances. 
 